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Notes and Comments
Federal Regulation of Discretionary
Commodity Accounts
By Rachel Brandenburg Baker*
Public interest in the rapidly expanding commodity1 futures
market 2 has increased dramatically in recent years.3 The leverage
* B.A., 1977, University of Chicago. Member, Third Year Class.
1. The Commodity Exchange Act defines commodity to include all goods, articles, ser-
vices, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are traded (except onions).
7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Before an exchange may conduct trading in a particular commodity, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, upon a showing that all statutory requirements
are met, must designate the exchange as a contract market for that particular commodity.
Id. § 8. The following commodities have exchanges that have been designated as contract
markets by the Commission: barley, Belgian francs, British pounds, butter, Canadian dol-
lars, cattle, cocoa, coconut oil, coffee, commercial paper, copper, corn, cotton, crude oil,
Dutch guilders, eggs, flaxseed, French francs, frozen boneless beef, frozen orange juice, fro-
zen pork bellies, German deutschemarks, gold, grain sorghums, heating oil, iced broilers,
Idaho potatoes, industrial fuel oil, Italian lira, Japanese yen, liquified propane, live hogs,
lumber, Maine potatoes, Mexican pesos, mortgages, natural rubber, oats, palladium, palm
oil, platinum, plywood, rubber, rye, silver, skinned hams, soybean meal, soybean oil, soy-
beans, stud lumber, sugar, Swiss francs, turkeys, United States silver coins, United States
Treasury bills, United States Treasury bondsi wheat, and wool. General Guide [1979] COMM.
Ftrr. L. REP. (CCH) 1 104, at 1,016..
2. A futures contract is a legally binding commitment to deliver or to take delivery of
a given quantity of a commodity during a specified month, at a price agreed upon at the
time the contract is made. As a result of the standardization of futures contracts, one fu-
tures contract is considered identical and interchangeable with all other futures contracts of
the same delivery month. The effect of this fungibility is that the original seller can offset
his or her obligation to deliver the commodity against the contract by contracting as a pur-
chaser to take delivery of the same quantity of the commodity during the same month.
The standardization of terms also allows the buyer of futures contracts the same ability
to liquidate his or her obligation to take delivery by contracting as a seller to deliver the
same quantity of the commodity during the same month. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess. app., at 130 (1974). In both situations the equal and opposite transactions
offset one another as to quantity, leaving the trader with profit or loss depending on the
price differential of the offsetting contracts. "Standardization of contracts ... served to add
two new dimensions to commodity futures trading. In addition to serving as an alternative
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of funds allowed under the liberal margin requirements4 creates a
high degree of risk in commodity futures speculation and allows
investors the potential of gains, and the concomitant risk of losses,
many times the amount of their original investment.5 With partici-
pation in commodity futures speculation expanding as investors
seek a greater rate of return on their investments, there has been a
corresponding increase in litigation alleging fraudulent conduct in
commodity futures practices.' Many of these actions involve claims
arising from abuses in the management of discretionary commod-
ity accounts. 7
to selling the actual goods on the spot market, futures trading became a means of financial
protection through the practice of 'hedging' as well as an important field of investment for
speculators." Jones & Cook, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 5
MEM. ST. U.L. Rav. 457, 460 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
3. In 1973, commodity futures trading increased by 40% over 1972, the previous re-
cord volume year, to 25,800,000 futures contracts. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Act of 1974: Hearings on H.R. 11955 Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 265 (1974) (statement of John Clagett, President, Association of Commodity Ex-
change Firms, Inc.). The 1977 total, trading volume rose to more than 42,000,000 contracts,
valued at over $1,100,000,000,000. S. RaP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1978). For a
detailed presentation of data, see Futures Industry Association Inc., Bull. No. 2859, Esti-
mated "Value" of Commodities Traded 1976-1977 (1977); Futures Industry Association Inc.,
Bull. No. 2855 (1975); Association of Commodity Exchange Firms, Inc., Bull. No. 1564
(1975); Association of Commodity Exchange Firms, Inc., Bull. No. 1563 (1975).
The influx of speculators into the commodity futures market appears to be the source
of this dramatic increase in the volume of commodity futures contracts. Comment, Reflec-
tions of 10b-5 in the "Pool" of Commodity Futures Antifraud, 14 Hous. L. Rav. 899, 903 &
n.33 (1977). See S. RaP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1978) (increases in futures trading
attributed to entrance of "speculative public"). Prior to 1974, the government countered
sharp increases in commodity prices by periodically releasing its stockpiles of commodities.
Id. at 8.
4. "Margin" trading permits the purchase of a commodity futures contract by advanc-
ing only a small percentage of the contract's value.
5. See, e.g., Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1977) (losses
$17,880 in excess of original investment); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274,
275 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972) (net loss $7,428 greater than amount
deposited).
6. See notes 31-33, 39-45 & accompanying text infra.
7. A discretionary account is a brokerage account in which an investor deposits money
with a commodity trading advisor on the understanding that the advisor may use such
funds at his or her discretion to trade in the marketplace for the benefit of the investor, in a
manner consistent with the investment objectives of the investor. In essence, the commodity
trading advisor is given a power of attorney over the customer's investments. The advisor
does not share in any profits generated by a discretionary account, but instead receives com-
missions on the commodity transactions. See notes 30-48 & accompanying text infra. A
commodity trading advisor is "any person who, for compensation or profit, engages in the
business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the
value of commodities or as to the advisability of trading in any commodity for future deliv-
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A commodity futures contract is not a security;8 however,
many investors have argued that discretionary accounts are invest-
ment contracts and that they are therefore within the definition of
a security under the federal securities laws. 9 Federal courts ad-
dressing this question have divided sharply on the interpretation
of the term "investment contract" and have produced conflicting
decisions on the issue of whether a discretionary commodity ac-
count is a security.10 Courts that interpret investment contracts to
include discretionary accounts allow a claim arising from a single
fraudulent scheme, involving both a security and commodity fu-
tures, to be brought under the federal securities acts. 1 Courts that
do not interpret investment contracts to include discretionary ac-
counts, on the other hand, will not allow a claim arising from such
an account to be brought under the federal securities acts. 2
This Note first addresses the existing conflict in the federal
courts over the applicability of the federal securities laws to discre-
ery on or subject to the rules of any contract market." 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
8. Rasmussen v. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc., 608 F.2d 175,
177 (5th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 520 n.9 (5th Cir.
1974); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Burkholder, 413 F. Supp. 852, 860 (D.D.C. 1976); Rochkind v.
Reynolds Sec., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 254, 255 n.1 (D. Md. 1975); Golding v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 1182, 1183 (S.D.N.Y.'1974); Berman v. Dean
Witter & Co., 353 F. Supp. 669, 671 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Schwartz v. Bache & Co., 340 F. Supp.
995, 998-99 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701, 702
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp.
359, 366-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
9. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 defines the term security to include: "any
note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest
or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security', or any
certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 15
U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976). The definition of a security contained in § 3(a)(10) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 is substantially identical to that contained in the 1933 Act. See id.
§ 78c(a)(10); S. RFaP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934); United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36,
342 (1967).
10. See notes 31-45 & accompanying text infra. On the other hand, trading accounts in
which the investor and the advisor split the profits accruing from the account are considered
within the definition of a security as a "certificate of interest or participation in a profit-
sharing agreement." See, e.g., SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709, 721-22 (N.D. Tex. 1961);
SEC v. Wickham, 12 F. Supp. 245, 249 (D. Minn. 1935).
11. See notes 31-38 & accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 39-45 & accompanying text infra.
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tionary commodity accounts. The Note next evaluates the ade-
quacy of investor protection provided by the Commodity Exchange
Act13 and concludes that regulation of discretionary commodity ac-
counts under the federal securities acts is a needless duplication of
effort by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
Interpretation of the Term "Investment Contract":
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.
In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,14 the SEC sought to enjoin W.J.
Howey Company from offering parcels of a citrus grove develop-
ment for sale.15 The SEC claimed that the offering was not regis-
tered and that it was thereby in violation of section 5(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933.16 The offering was alleged to be an invest-
ment contract within the definition of a "security" set forth in the
1933 Act. In determining whether this sales scheme constituted an
investment contract, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Murphy, noted that the term investment contract remained unde-
fined in both the federal securities acts and the state blue sky
laws1 7 existing prior to the enactment of the scheme of federal se-
curities regulation. Notwithstanding the lack of a clear definition
of investment contract, courts had broadly construed the term as it
existed under state law "to afford the investing public a full mea-
sure of protection. Form was disregarded for substance and em-
phasis was placed on economic reality." ' The Court reasoned that
13. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
14. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
15. Id. at 295. The parcels of land sold by the Howey Company were narrow strips
without separate fencing. Small markers, the meaning of which could be discovered only by
reference to the company's records, were the sole indications of separate ownership within
the grove. Id. The sale of real property was coupled with a service contract for cultivating
and harvesting the groves, marketing the crops, and remitting the net proceeds to the inves-
tor. These service contracts were executed between the investor and Howey-in-the-Hills
Service, Inc., a corporation under identical management as the Howey Company. Although
the investor was free to make arrangements with other service companies, he or she was
warned by the Howey Company that the investment was not feasible unless proper service
arrangements were executed. The superiority of the management of Howey-in-the-Hills, Inc.
was also greatly emphasized. Id.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1976).
17. The term blue sky laws refers to state legislation regulating the sale or distribution
of securities.
18. 328 U.S. at 298.
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Congress' use of the term investment contract embraced this prior
judicial interpretation and that such construction fulfilled "the
statutory purpose of compelling full and fair disclosure relative to
the issuance of 'the many types of instruments that in our com-
mercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security.' ,
The Court therefore adopted a broad standard based upon the re-
medial nature of the federal securities laws, providing: "an invest-
ment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract,
transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the ef-
forts of the promoter or a third party.
'20
Three elements are subsumed under the Howey test for a se-
curity:21 There must be an investment of money, there must be a
common enterprise present in the scheme, and the profits from the
scheme must be derived solely from the efforts of persons other
than the investor. Discretionary accounts fulfill two of the three
Howey requirements for an investment contract: They involve an
investment of money,22 and the profits from the account come
solely from the efforts of others.23 The fundamental controversy
19. Id. at 299 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933)).
20. 328 U.S. at 298-99.
21. See SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 1974).
22. Id.
23. Id. "By profits, the Court has meant either capital appreciation resulting from the
development of the initial investment, as in [SEC v.] Joiner [, 320 U.S. 344 (1943)] (sale of
oil leases conditioned on promoters' agreement to drill exploratory well), or participation in
earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds as in Tcherepnin v. Knight [, 389 U.S.
332 (1967)] (dividends on the investment based on savings and loan association's profits)."
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975).
In Forman, the United States Supreme Court expressly left unanswered the question of
whether it would be willing under appropriate circumstances "to abandon the element of
profits in the definition of securities and to adopt the 'risk capital' approach articulated by
the California Supreme Court in Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361
P.2d 906 (1961)." Id. at 857 n.24 (also citing El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974)). See generally Coffey, The Economic Realities
of a 'Security': Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 367 (1967);
Hanann & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal
Securities, 25 HAsnNGs L.J. 219 (1974); Long, An Attempt to Return 'Investment Con-
tracts' to Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 135 (1971).
The risk capital approach was used by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Commissioner of
See. v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Haw. 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971), in which the court held
that "an investment contract is created whenever: (1) An offeree furnishes initial value to
an offeror, and (2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise,
and (3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's promises or representa-
tions which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind,
over and above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of the
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that has created a division in the federal courts involves the issue
of whether the money in a discretionary account is invested in a
common enterprise.
The conflict in the interpretation of the term common enter-
prise is based upon the determination of whether a relationship
between an investor and a manager is sufficient to fulfill the re-
quirement of common enterprise. Courts interpreting the term
common enterprise to contemplate an actual pooling of funds be-
tween investors require a horizontal coinmonality between the in-
vestors in an enterprise.2 Accordingly, these courts do not find the
vertical commonality that is present in the unitary relationship be-
tween the investor and the manager of a discretionary account suf-
ficient to satisfy the requirement of common enterprise.25 Other
courts hold that the element of common enterprise is fulfilled in
discretionary accounts by the presence of the vertical commonality
existing between the investor and the manager of the discretionary
account.26 These latter courts emphasize the economic reality re-
flected in the fact that the overall success of a particular manager
affects all investors, as a group entwined in a common venture,
who entrust discretionary authority to that manager.
Regulation of Discretionary Commodity Accounts:
Vertical Commonality versus Horizontal
Commonality
Extending the Jurisdiction of the Federal Securities Acts:
The Concept of Vertical Commonality
In SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,7 a decision
holding a pyramid sales scheme to be within the Howey test for a
security, the Ninth Circuit set forth a definition of common enter-
prise. It provided that "[a] common enterprise is one in which the
fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon
enterprise, and (4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual
control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise." Id. at 648-49, 485 P.2d at 109. The
SEC has taken the position that the analysis of the term investment contract in Hawaii
Market Center is applicable under the federal securities laws. SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5211, Exchange Act Release No. 9387 (Nov. 30, 1971).
24. See notes 39-45 & accompanying text infra.
25. See notes 42-45 & accompanying text infra.
26. See notes 27-38 & accompanying text infra.
27. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
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the efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of third
parties."28 The Fifth Circuit, in considering another pyramid sales
scheme, adopted this definition in SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary,
Inc.,29 and added that "[tihe critical factor is not the similitude or
coincidence of investor input, but rather the uniformity of impact
of the promoter's efforts.
3 0
Following the Fifth Circuit's holding in Koscot Interplane-
tary, a number of courts applied the Turner definition to discre-
tionary commodity accounts, holding them to be securities and
thus subject to regulation under the federal securities acts."1 These
courts reasoned that the presence of a vertical commonality be-
tween investors that is based on their shared reliance on a single
manager for success in their investments satisfied the common. en-
terprise element of the term investment contract.$2 Several cases
further extended the concept of vertical commonality by allowing a
connection between a single investor and a manager to satisfy the
element of common enterprise.33
Courts that held discretionary commodity accounts to be in-
vestment contracts uniformly based their holdings on the broad re-
medial purposes of the federal securities laws, 4 emphasizing the
28. Id. at 482 n.7.
29. 497 F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 1974).
30. Id.
31. See Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Continental Com-
modities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
32. This analysis also has been applied to discretionary stock option and securities
accounts, see Troyer v. Karcagi, 476 F. Supp. 1142 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Securities Investor Pro-
tection Corp. v. Associated Underwriters, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 168 (D. Utah 1975), as well as to
other investment schemes, see Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1976) (livestock);
Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974) (chinchillas); Los An-
geles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 919 (1961) (mortgages and deeds of trust).
33. See Marshall v. Lamson Bros. & Co., 368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Mitzner v.
Cardet Int'l, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co.,
291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968). See generally Note, Discretionary Commodities Trading
Account as a Security: Is There a Common Enterprise, 28 Sw. L.J. 602 (1974) (approving
the result reached in Marshall).
34. In SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974), the court
asserted that Koscot Interplanetary "decried a litmus application of the Howey test and
expressed [a] preference for a resilient standard which would comport with the uniformly
acclaimed remedial purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934." Id. at 521. The court in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d 476, 481 n.5
(9th Cir. 1973), quoted S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933): "The aim is to prevent
further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securi-
ties through misrepresentation; to place adequate and true information before the investor;
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vast array of investment schemes that have been held to involve
securities within the definition of the federal securities acts. 5 As
stated by one court, the motivation underlying these decisions was
"a desire to afford to public investors in the commodities futures
market the same kind of protection afforded to investors in the
stock market."' 6 Faced with the limited scope of the regulatory
protection provided to those investing in commodity futures prior
to the 1974 amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act 7 and
the significant expansion of public participation in the commodity
futures market, these courts were compelled to extend the jurisdic-
tion of the federal securities laws to discretionary commodity ac-
counts. The courts reasoned that expanded jurisdiction was neces-
sary to ensure investors in the commodity futures market an
adequate measure of protection against fraudulent and deceptive
practices. s
Literal Construction of the Requirement of Common En-
terprise: The Concept of Horizontal Commonality
In Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 9 the Seventh Circuit,
in an opinion by Judge (now Justice) Stevens, held that investors
in discretionary commodity accounts must stand as "joint partici-
pants in the same" investment scheme to fulfill the requirement of
common enterprise.4 0 Although Milnarik did not directly address
the issue of whether the common enterprise requirement contem-
plated an actual pooling of funds, the Seventh Circuit later stated
to protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest presentation, against the competition
afforded by dishonest securities offered to the public through crooked promotion." See also
Rochkind v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 254, 256-57 (D. Md. 1975). This emphasis on
the broad remedial purposes of the federal securities acts was the same reason the Howey
Court set forth as a justification for adopting a broad definition of the term investment
contract. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
35. For examples of the diverse schemes that have been held to involve securities, see
Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905
(1967) (beavers); Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824
(1961) (mineral leases); Los Angeles Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961) (mortgages and deeds of trust); Penfield Co. v. SEC,
143 F.2d 746 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 768 (1944) (whiskey bottling contracts); SEC
v. Crude Oil Corp. of America, 93 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1937) (crude oil sales contracts).
36. E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Schank, 456 F. Supp. 507, 512 (D. Utah 1976).
37. See notes 51-55 & accompanying text infra.
38. See note 34 supra.
39. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
40. 457 F.2d at 277.
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that indeed "Milnarik was based on the assumption that a sharing
or pooling of funds is required by Howey .... ,,41 The court in
Milnarik viewed the discretionary account for the trading of com-
modity futures as simply "an oral agency agreement in which the
theoretical 'seller' becomes the agent of the 'buyer.' -41 Thus, the
court concluded that the discretionary account essentially created
an agency-for-hire, and not the sale of a unit within a common
enterprise.43 Although the Milnarik court recognized the purpose
of the registration requirement under the Securities Act of 1933 as
one of protecting the investing public, thus deferring to the strict
rule of construction against finding investments to be outside the
scope of the federal securities laws, 44 the court nevertheless con-
cluded that the unitary nature of the contract giving the manager
discretionary authority to conduct transactions precluded any find-
ing of common enterprise.
45
Regulation of Discretionary Commodity Accounts
Under the Amended Commodity Exchange Act
Uniformity in the field of securities regulation is a prerequisite
to the ability of the federal securities acts to serve as an effective
protector of the. investing public. The number of decisions inter-
preting common enterprise under a theory of vertical commonal-
ity4" and the corresponding number of contrary decisions inter-
preting common enterprise under a theory of horizontal
commonality47 reflect a sharp division in the federal courts.48 The
41. Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1977).
42. 457 F.2d at 277.
43. Id.
44. Id. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); SEC v. Culpepper, 270
F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959).
45. 457 F.2d at 277. See Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F. Supp.
311 (S.D. Ohio 1979); Sunshine Kitchens v. Alanthus Corp., 403 F. Supp. 719, 721-22 (S.D.
Fla. 1975); Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066, 1069 (M.D. Pa. 1972),
aff'd without opinion, 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 994 (1974). But see
Troyer v. Karcagi, 476 F. Supp. 1142 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (discretionary securities account);
Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Maheu v. Reynolds &
Co., 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Stuckey v. duPont Glore Forgan Inc., 59
F.R.D. 129, 131 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
46. See notes 27-38 & accompanying text supra.
47. See notes 39-45 & accompanying text supra.
48. The Ninth Circuit decision of Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978),
developed a third approach to the interpretation of the requirement of common enterprise.
The court used the same expansive definition of common enterprise that it had developed in
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result of this conflict is that the scope of the protection available to
individual investors is relegated to a mere fortuity; the court in
which an investor brings an action under the federal securities laws
determines the availability of his or her access to protection under
those laws.
The essence of the issue concerning whether a discretionary
commodity account constitutes an investment contract under the
securities laws has involved the determination of whether the ac-
count involves a common enterprise.49 This issue, however, is more
effectively analyzed by determining if there is a need for regulation
of these accounts under the securities acts. The regulatory controls
imposed by the amended Commodity Exchange Act"0 and the rules
and regulations enacted pursuant to the authority granted to the
CFTC offer a comprehensive system of protection to persons in-
vesting in discretionary commodity accounts. The analysis sup-
porting the decisions rendered prior to the effective date of the
1974 amendments therefore must be reappraised in terms of the
present regulatory structure of the commodity futures markets.
Prior to the 1974 amendments to the Commodity Exchange
Act,51 federal regulation of commodity futures covered only 1,923
individuals and firms registered with the Department of Agricul-
ture.5 2 The Act was amended to divest the Department of Agricul-
Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, see notes 27-33 & accompanying text supra, yet failed to find
a common enterprise between the investor and the broker managing the investor's discre-
tionary commodity account. Examining the broker's duties in managing the discretionary
account, the Brodt court stated: "the success or failure of Bache as a brokerage house does
not correlate with individual investor profit or loss. On the-contrary, Bache could reap large
commissions for itself and be characterized as successful, while the individual accounts
could be wiped out. Here, strong efforts by Bache will not guarantee a return nor will
Bache's success necessarily mean a corresponding success for Brodt. Weak efforts or failure
by Bache will deprive Brodt of potential gains but will not necessarily mean that he will
suffer serious losses. Thus, since there is no direct correlation on either the success or failure
side, we hold there is no common enterprise between Bache and Brodt." 595 F.2d at 461.
The court's interpretation of common enterprise contemplates a commonality of
financial interest. Id. at 462. An interdependence between the success of the investor's dis-
cretionary account and the profits accruing to the manager of such account thus would ap-
pear to be a prerequisite to a finding of vertical commonality under Brodt. Only where the
potential for profit and risk of loss for both the investor and the advisor depend on the
performance of the investments in the discretionary account will such commonality be
present.
49. See notes 31-45 & accompanying text supra.
50. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979).
51. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (effective April 21, 1975).
52. COMMODITY EXCHANGE AUTHORITY, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, ANNUAL REPORT OF
REGISTRATION AND AUDIT DMSION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1974, at 1 (1974).
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ture of authority over commodity futures regulation and transfer
that authority to the CFTC.5 s
Section 2(a)(1) of the amended Commodity Exchange Act
grants the CFTC "exclusive jurisdiction with respect to accounts,
agreements ... and transactions involving contracts of sale of a
commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a contract
market." 4 The magnitude of this jurisdictional grant was such
that by November, 1977, over 36,000 individuals and firms were
registered with and regulated by the CFTC,s a 1700% increase in
the number of registrants in just over three years. Pursuant to this
statutory authority, the CFTC has asserted exclusive regulatory
and administrative authority over discretionary commodity ac-
counts,56 and has announced its intention to file amicus curiae
briefs on behalf of appropriate defendants in suits resulting from
the SEC's assertion of jurisdiction to regulate commodity futures
schemes.57
Section 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act58 sets forth a
broad proscription of fraudulent activity in connection with com-
modity futures trading activities:
It shall be unlawful... for any member of a contract market, or
for any correspondent, agent, or employee of any member, in or
in connection with any order to make, or the making of ... any
contract of sale of any commodity for future delivery ... (A) to
cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such other per-
son; . . .or (C) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such
other persons by any means whatsoever in regard to any such or-
53. "There is hereby established, as an independent agency of the United States Gov-
ernment, a Commodity Futures Trading Commission. The Commission shall be composed of
five Commissioners, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. In nominating persons for appointment, the President shall seek to
establish and maintain a balanced Commission, including but not limited to, persons of
demonstrated knowledge in futures trading or its regulation and persons of demonstrated
knowledge in the production, merchandising, processing or distribution of one or more of
the commodities or other goods and articles, services, rights and interests covered by this
Act." 7 U.S.C. § 4a(a)(1) (Supp. II 1979).
54. Id. § 2. This broad grant of authority reflected Congress' view that no supplemen-
tal state regulation of commodities trading would be needed. H.R. RP. No. 1383, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 36, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5894, 5897.
55. OFFICE OF QUALIFICATIONS & REGISTRATION, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMIS-
SION, MoNTrLy REPORT FOR OcTOBER 1977 (1977).
56. CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 77-2, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L.
REP. (CCH) 20,257, at 21,372 (1977).
57. Id. at 21,373.
58. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976).
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der or contract or the disposition or execution of any such order
or contract, or in regard to any act of agency performed with re-
spect to such order or contract for such person .... "
The proscription in section 4b has been held to support actions for
breach of contract,60 unauthorized trading,6' misrepresentation, 62
breach of fiduciary duty,6 s and violation of exchange rules,6 4 and
may apply to certain forms of carelessness.65 Section 4b thus offers
59. Id.
60. See Hicks v. Lincolnwood, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) $ 20,553 (C.F.T.C. 1978) (failure to follow client instructions); Sherwood v. Madda
Trading Co., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,401 (C.F.T.C.
1977), aff'd as to liability, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,728
(C.F.T.C. 1979). Frederick White has stated: "A simple breach of contract not involving
deception does not seem to come within the term fraud... but should perhaps be viewed
as cheating in view of the commodity professi6nal's implicit duty to deal fairly with custom-
ers." [1977] 423 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) B-2 n.4.
61. Unauthorized trading may involve failing to perform contract obligations, see note
60 supra, or performing acts outside the authority granted under a contract. In Anders v.
Murlas Bros. Commodities, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
$ 20,827 (C.F.T.C. 1979), the commission held that a futures commission merchant had vio-
lated § 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act by trading in commodities that the client specif-
ically had excluded from the authority granted to enter into commodity transactions, stat-
ing: "It is well settled that an account executive's entry of commodity futures transactions
for a customer's account without his authorization, is a violation of section 4b of the Act."
Id.
62. See Damiani v. Futures Inv. Co., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUr. L. RaP.
(CCH) 20,507 (C.F.T.C. 1977), review granted, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L.
REP. (CCH) 20,666 (C.F.T.C. 1978).
63. See Gordon v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm.
FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,427 (C.F.T.C. 1977).
64. See Graves v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] CoMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) $ 20,478 (C.F.T.C. 1977), review granted, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,632 (C.F.T.C. 1978) (violation of the rules of the Chicago
Board of Trade constituted fraud under § 4b).
65. Whether negligent conduct may ever constitute a violation of the Commodity Ex-
change Act remains an open question. Language indicating that a negligence standard is
appropriate was set forth in Gordon v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FUr. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,427 (C.F.T.C. 1977). Thereafter a negligence stan-
dard was clearly rejected in a few cases. See Brown v. Nickel, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,424 (C.F.T.C. 1977); McGilvray v. Hornblower & Weeks,
Hemphill, Noyes, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. RaP. (CCH) 20,419
(C.F.T.C. 1977). In the subsequent decision of Wattay v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.,
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) $ 20,511 (C.F.T.C. 1977), it was
held that willfulness under § 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act could be proven if "a
person (1) intentionally does an act which is prohibited, irrespective of evil motive or reli-
ance on erroneous advice, or (2) acts with careless disregard of statutory requirements." Id.
Similarly, in CFTC v. Savage, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. RaP. (CCH)
T 20,926 (9th Cir. 1979), the court held that a violation of § 4b required the presence of the
element of knowledge, but proceeded to state: "Knowledge, of course, exists when one acts
in careless disregard of whether his acts amount to cheating, filing false reports, etc. That is,
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protection to investors against a wide range of misconduct in the
handling of commodity futures accounts. There also is some indi-
cation that the standard of care imposed upon an advisor manag-
ing a discretionary account is more stringent than that imposed
in nondiscretionary accounts, 6  a factor that further emphasizes
the sufficiency of the protection provided under the Commodity
Exchange Act to investors engaging in commodity futures
transactions.
In addition to the comprehensive prohibition of fraudulent ac-
tivity set forth in section 4b, the CFTC is vested with rulemaking
authority to govern its operating procedures6 7 and has enacted sev-
eral rules specifically designed to protect those who invest through
discretionary commodity accounts. Each registrant with the CFTC
is under a duty to supervise diligently the handling of all commod-
ity accounts operated or advised by its partners, officers, employ-
ees, or agents. 8 Advertising based on the performance of simulated
or hypothetical accounts is prohibited by the CFTC.6 1 Authoriza-
tion of discretionary power must be executed in writing.70 The
CFTC requires firms engaging in commodity brokerage activities
to segregate the money, securities, and property of each cus-
tomer,71 and to provide customers with written confirmation of all
trades.7 2 Additionally, detailed recordkeeping requirements specifi-
cally suited to accounting practices in the commodity futures field
are prescribed.73 Most importantly, the CFTC requires that com-
modity trading advisors furnish each commodity futures investor
with a disclosure document explaining the risk of loss inherent in
trading commodity futures contracts and warning that the high de-
gree of leverage available in futures trading creates the potential
the element of knowledge cannot be precluded by ignorance brought about by willfully or
carelessly ignoring the truth." Id.
66. See Robinson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 107
(N.D. Ala. 1971), af'd per curiam, 453 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1972). A greater duty of care than
is required in handling nondiscretionary securities accounts has been imposed upon those
advising and managing discretionary securities accounts. See, e.g., Leib v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Van Allen v. Dominick &
Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 560 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1977).
67. 7 U.S.C. § 4a(j) (1976).
68. 17 C.F.R. § 166.3 (1980).
69. 42 Fed. Reg. 44,748 (1977) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 166.6).
70. 17 C.F.R. § 166.2 (1980).
71. Id. § 1.20.
72. Id. § 1.33(a)(2).
73. Id. §§ 1.31-.39.
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for large and rapid losses as well as gains.Y
The scope of the regulation affording protection to the inves-
tor in a discretionary commodity account under the Commodity
Exchange Act78 obviates any reason to require these accounts to be
registered under the Securities Act of 1933.76 Furthermore, the
protection afforded by the Commodity Exchange Act is more effec-
tive than that provided by disclosures effected under the registra-
tion process of the 1933 Act because the CFTC's rules relate spe-
cifically to the abuses endemic to commodity futures trading.
77
74. Id. § 4.31. A client opening a discretionary commodity account must be furnished
the following information prior to the time such agreement is executed: the name, business
address, and-business background of the advisor for the five years preceeding the document;
whether the advisor has exercised discretionary authority over commodity accounts in the
preceeding year and if the performance records of such accounts are available to the pro-
spective client; a complete schedule of all fees associated with such accounts and whether
the advisor trades or intends to trade commodity interests for its own account, and whether
the performance of such account will be available to the client. This information must be
accompanied by a cautionary statement prominently displayed on the cover page of the
document stating, "The Commodity Futures Trading Commission has not reviewed this
Disclosure Document and has not determined whether it is accurate or complete." Further,
a copy of such document must be delivered to the CFTC.
This specific information must be accompanied by a standard "Risk Disclosure State-
ment" drafted by the CFTC which provides:
"The risk of loss in trading commodity contracts can be substantial. You should there-
fore carefully consider whether such trading is suitable for you in light of your financial
condition. In considering whether to trade or to authorize someone else to trade for you, you
should be aware of the following: (1) You may sustain a total loss of the initial margin
funds and any additional funds that you deposit with your broker to establish or maintain a
position in the commodity futures market. If the market moves against your position, you
may be called upon by your broker to deposit a substantial amount of additional margin
funds, on short notice, in order to maintain your position. If you do not provide the required
funds within the prescribed time, your position may be liquidated at a loss, and you will be
liable for any resulting deficit in your account. (2) Under certain market conditions, you
may find it difficult or impossible to liquidate a position. This can occur, for example, when
the market makes, a 'limit move.' (3) The placement of contingent orders by you or your
trading advisor, such as a 'stop-loss' or 'stop-limit' order, will not necessarily limit your
losses to the intended amounts, since market conditions may make it impossible to execute
such orders. (4) A 'spread' position may not be less risky than a simple 'long' or 'short'
position. (5) The high degree of leverage that is often obtainable in futures trading because
of the small margin requirements can work against you as well as for you. The use of lever-
age can lead to large losses as well as gains. This brief statement cannot, of course, disclose
all the risks and other significant aspects of the commodity futures markets. You should
therefore carefully study this Disclosure Document and futures trading before you trade."
Id.
75. See notes 50-74 & accompanying text supra.
76. See 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1976).
77. "Often erroneously viewed as twins, there is little correlation in theory or in fact
between the regulation of futures trading and the regulation of securities transactions. Fu.
tures trading regulation is essentially a regulation of a marketing device, that is a contract
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Another factor militating against continued assertion of juris-
diction by the SEC is the great likelihood that a discretionary ac-
count would be exempt from the registration requirements of the
Securities Act of 1933 and that the investor thereby would be left
uninformed as to the risks involved in particular investments.
78 If
an exemption did not apply to the discretionary account, it is im-
probable that the discretionary account could be offered to the
public at all because the cost of complying with the registration
requirements is often prohibitive.79 Even if the material disclosed
by a registration statement were available, it probably would be of
little utility to the investor in a discretionary account because the
very purpose of such an investment medium is to allow one who is
ignorant of the operation of the commodity futures market to com-
pensate another for his or her expertise. Requiring investors to
study the intricacies of a securities registration filing so that they
will be capable of policing those exercising discretionary authority
over their investments undermines the very concept of allowing in-
vestors the opportunity to rely on another's expertise in invest-
ment matters. The cautionary risk disclosure statement that must
be supplied by commodity trading advisors to investors in discre-
tionary commodity accounts 0 is a much more effective device for
allowing an unsophisticated investor to evaluate the risks of a pro-
posed transaction than are the technical and carefully qualified
statements contained in a securities registration statement.81
The inclusion of discretionary accounts within the protection
of the federal securities acts thus merely serves to avail investors
of the securities acts' antifraud provisions.82 Although the language
right which is terminable at a time certain, for mainly agricultural commodities while the
SEC regulates the handling of certificates of tangible ownership which are permanent in
nature. . . ." H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1974).
78. See generally Rasmussen v. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc.,
608 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1979).
79. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, Sacusrris REGULATION 112-13 (4th ed. 1977).
80. See note 74 supra.
81. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, Sncusrrms REGULATION 141-90 (4th ed. 1977).
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 6(b) (1976). "Although it has been held that the protections
against fraudulent and misleading conduct afforded by the CFTC Act are not as comprehen-
sive as the protections which are available in SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, [see
McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 347 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. La. 1972), aff'd on other grounds,
477 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1973),] it is important to note that the decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), requiring that there be scienter
as a prerequisite to a 10b-5 suit, essentially brings the fraudulent conduct protections of the
securities acts in line with the 'willful' fraud provisions of the CFTC Act." E.F. Hutton &
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of the antifraud provisions contained in the securities acts is fun-
damentally equivalent to the protections available under the Com-
modity Exchange Act, the substantial body of law developed under
the securities acts' antifraud provisions renders the outcome of a
dispute under the securities laws far less speculative than a suit
brought under the Commodity Exchange Act. The availability of a
private right of action under rule 10b-5 of the securities laws is
well established, 83 whereas the availability of a private right of ac-
tion under the Commodity Exchange Act remains less clear." In
addition, the Securities Act of 1933 provides for rescission upon a
showing of failure to register nonexempt securities and does not
require a showing of fraud. 5
The question that has divided the federal courts thus is
whether investors in discretionary commodity accounts may bring
a suit under the antifraud provisions of the securities acts. Two
reasons are apparent for denying those investing in discretionary
commodity accounts a right of action under the securities acts.
First, the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniels6 interprets the opera-
tion of the federal securities laws in the field of private pension
plans, and, by analogy, may be interpreted as limiting the jurisdic-
tion of the federal securities acts in the area of discretionary com-
modity accounts. Second, the CFTC's mandate of exclusive juris-
diction 7 preempts the SEC from exercising jurisdiction over the
Co. v. Schank, 456 F. Supp. 507, 513 (D. Utah 1976).
83. Superintendent of Ins. of the State of New York v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
84. See Deaktor v. L.D. Schreiber & Co., 479 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), rev'd per curiam sub
nom. Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973); Booth v. Peavey Co. Com-
modity Serv., 430 F.2d 132, (8th Cir. 1970); Johnson v. Arthur Espey, Shearson, Hamill &
Co., 341 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1338
(E.D. La. 1972); United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 311 F. Supp. 1375 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Ames v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,283 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), revzd on other grounds, 567 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir. 1977).
The CFTC has interpreted the Act as implicitly authorizing a private right of action.
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction: Statement Concerning Referrals of Private Litigation, 41
Fed. Reg. 18,471, 18,472 (1976). Considerable deference generally is granted to the reasona-
ble interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its administration. Udall v. Tall-
man, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). But cf. Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. Tex.
1979) (refused to imply a right of private action).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976).
86. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
87. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
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regulation of discretionary commodity accounts.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel
The history of the operation of private pension plans bears a
close resemblance to that of commodity futures trading. Private
pension plans historically have been a source of inequity to their
participants because of irresponsible, incompetent, or fraudulent
plan management.8 8 Legislative action amending the Commodity
Exchange Act, as well as that enacting the Employees Retirement
Insurance Security Act (ERISA),89 was presaged by frauds involv-
ing the misappropriation of millions of dollars of investors' funds.90
Similarly, the increase in commodity futures trading volume dur-
ing recent years91 also has been paralleled in the field of private
pension plans.
92
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel" presented
the issue of whether private noncontributory pension plans ful-
filled the Howey test for an investment contract and therefore con-
stituted a security. The respondent, Daniel, was denied a pension
under. a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan because a break
in his employment resulted in his failure to comply with the re-
quirement that an employee have twenty years of continuous ser-
vice prior to the vesting of pension rights.94 Daniel filed suit
against the union and the trustee of the pension fund alleging that
they had misrepresented facts and fraudulently omitted to state
material. facts regarding the value of a covered employee's interest
in the pension plan. Daniel alleged that such misstatements and
88. See H.R. Rm. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CoNG. & AD. NEws 4639, 4643-45 (inequitable benefit eligibility requirements); SENATE
COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, INTERIM REPORT OF ACTIrrVIEs OF THE PRIVATE WEL-
FARE AND PENSION PLAN STUDY, S. RE. No. 634, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 71-72 (1971) (inade-
quate funding); Private Welfare and Pension Plan Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1045,
H.R. 1046 and H.R. 16462 Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 470-72, 475 (1969) (fund management
misconduct).
89. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976).
90. See Greenstone, The CFTC and Government Reorganization: Preserving Regula-
tory Independence, 33 Bus. LAw. 163, 183 (1977).
91. See note 3 supra.
92. These plans currently shepherd assets exceeding $180,000,000,000 with an average
rate of growth estimated at $14,000,000,000 a year. See E. ALLEN, J. MuLoNE & J. RoSFN-
BLOOM, PENSION PLANNING 2 (3d ed. 1976).
93. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
94. Id. at 555.
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omissions constituted a fraud in connection with the sale of a se-
curity in violation'of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, the SEC's rule 10b-5, and section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933.91
Prior to Daniel, the federal courts were divided on the issue of
whether claims of fraud in private pension plan management were
actionable under the federal securities laws.96 The Supreme Court
held that Daniel's interest in the pension fund did not constitute
an investment contract and therefore was not subject to regulation
under the securities acts.
9 7
In denying the respondent's right to bring an action under the
securities acts,98 the Court reasoned that ERISA is a comprehen-
sive legislative scheme that not only requires disclosure of certain
information to employees in a specified manner, but also regulates
the substantive terms of pension plans by establishing standards
for plan funding and limitations on the eligibility requirements for
employees. 99 The Court concluded:
95. Id.
96. See Schlansky v. United Merchants & Mfrs., 443 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(antifraud provisions of federal securities laws applicable* to private pension plans); Daniel
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp. 541, 546-52 (N.D. IM. 1976), aff'd, 561 F.2d
1223 (7th Cir. 1977) (same). Cases finding federal securities laws inapplicable to fraud in
priVate pension plans include: Robinson v. United Mine Workers Health and Retirement
Funds, 435 F. Supp. 245, 246-47 (D.D.C. 1977); Hum v. Retirement Fund Trust, 424 F.
Supp. 80, 81-82 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Cinnamon v. Brooks, No. CV-77-204 LTL (C.D. Cal., filed
Nov. 8, 1977) (securities law claim dismissed); Wiens v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1196,005 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (bench opin-
ion). See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, at app. A, Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978) (citing 12 pending cases).
97. 439 U.S. at 559, 566-70. The Supreme Court's decision reversed the lower court
judgments in Daniel. The district court held that Daniel's interest in the pension fund con-
stituted a security because the pension plan created an investment contract. Daniel v. Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp. 541, 549-52 (N.D. IMI. 1976). The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court judgment, finding that all elements of the Howey test for estab-
lishing an investment contract were satisfied. Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561
F.2d 1223, 1231 (7th Cir. 1977).
98. Daniel involved a noncontributory compulsory, pension plan. The Court's holding
that such a plan is not a security has been extended to cover contributory but noncompul-
sory pension plans. See Newkirk v. General Elec. Co., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fan.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,216 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
99. 439 U.S. at 569. See Newkirk v. General Elec. Co., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. RFap. (CCH) 1 97,216 (N.D. Cal. 1979) ("ERISA ... by a comprehensive legisla-
tive scheme specifically requires that certain information as to pension plans be disclosed in
a specified manner, in contrast to the indefinite and uncertain disclosure obligations im-
posed by the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.").
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If any further evidence were needed to demonstrate that pension
plans of the type involved are not subject to the Securities Acts,
the enactment of ERISA in 1974 ...would put the matter to
rest. Unlike the Securities Acts, ERISA deals expressly and in de-
tail with pension plans... in contrast to the indefinite and un-
certain disclosure obligations imposed by the antifraud provisions
of the Securities Acts ...
The existence of this comprehensive legislation governing the
use and terms of employee pension plans severely undercuts all
arguments for extending the Securities Acts to noncontributory,
compulsory pension plans. Congress believed that it was filling a
regulatory void when it enacted ERISA.... Not only is the ex-
tension of the Securities Acts by the court below unsupported by
the language and history of those Acts, but in light of ERISA it
serves no general purpose.... Whatever benefits employees
might derive from the effect of the Securities Acts are now pro-
vided in more definite form through ERISA.100
The analogy to discretionary commodity accounts is compel-
ling. 101 The comprehensive legislation regulating the commodity
futures markets under the amended Commodity Exchange Act
10 2
similarly "severely undercuts all arguments for extending the Se-
curities Acts"103 to discretionary commodity accounts.0 4 Actions
under the antifraud provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act
have been based upon breach of contract,105 unauthorized trad-
ing,10 6 misrepresentation,1 0 7 breach of fiduciary duty,108 and viola-
tion of exchange rules, 109 thus evidencing the comprehensiveness of
the prohibition of fraudulent activity under the amended Com-
modity Exchange Act.
The Court's decision in Daniel specifically rejects the propri-
ety of extending the operation of the securities acts to an area in
which Congress has established an independent regulatory scheme.
A private litigant's desire to resort to the securities laws because of
100. 439 U.S. at 569-70.
101. See Bromberg, Securities Law-Relationship to Commodities Law, 35 Bus. LAw.
787, 794 (1980).
102. See notes 50-74 & accompanying text supra.
103. 439 U.S. at 569.
104. See notes 75-85 & accompanying text supra.
105. See note 60 & accompanying text supra.
106. See note 61 & accompanying text supra.
107. See note 62 & accompanying text supra.
108. See note 63 & accompanying text supra.
109. See note 64 & accompanying text supra.
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the availability of the substantial body of law decided under the
securities acts and the well established private right of action
under SEC rule 10b-5 can no longer justify expanding the scope of
the federal securities acts. Congressional intent to establish a com-
prehensive scheme of regulation of commodity futures trading
under the amended Commodity Exchange Act thus operates as a
bar to the judicial expansion of the jurisdictional scope of the se-
curities acts. Daniel's restrictive interpretation of the breadth of
the securities laws in areas where federal statutes might create
overlapping regulation is consistent with the Supreme Court's pol-
icy towards limiting the operation of private damages actions
brought under the securities acts.110
Discretionary Commodity Accounts: Within the Ambit of
the CFTC's Exclusive Jurisdiction
The Commodity Exchange Act provides that "the Commission
shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to accounts, agree-
ments . . and transactions involving contracts of sale of a com-
modity for future delivery.""' However, this provision is qualified
by the caveat that, "except as hereinabove provided, nothing con-
tained in this section shall. . . supersede or limit the jurisdiction
at any time conferred on the Securities and Exchange Commis-
11112 osion. The legislative history of this provision reveals the scope
of the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction intended by Congress:
The House bill provides for exclusive jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion over all futures transactions. However, it is provided that
such exclusive jurisdiction would not supersede or limit the juris-
diction of the Securities and Exchange Commission or other regu-
latory authorities.
110. See Brooks, Rule 10b-5 In the Balance: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's
Policy Perspective, 32 HASTINGs L.J. 403 (1981).
111. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
112. Id. In attempting to resolve the extent of CFTC jurisdiction conferred by the
broad grant of exclusive jurisdiction in light of the qualifying reservation, one federal dis-
trict court judge has concluded: "The key phrase in this proviso is the introductory one; I
must assume that it means exactly what it says. The fact is that the statements 'hereinabove
provided' do limit the jurisdiction of the S.E.C. with regard to commodity futures trading.
In effect, those statements transfer jurisdiction from the S.E.C. to the new Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission.... The Congress, by enacting this legislation, created a body
with special expertise in the commodities field and it is my belief that the wording of the
statute removes standing from the S.E.C. and vests it in the 'new' experts-the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission." SEC v. Univest, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1057, 1058-59 (N.D. M
1975), remanded without opinion, 556 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1977).
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The Senate amendment retains the provision of the House bill
but adds three clarifying amendments. The clarifying amend-
ments make clear that (a) the Commission's jurisdiction over fu-
tures contract markets or other exchanges is exclusive and in-
cludes the regulation of commodity accounts, commodity trading
agreements, and commodity options; and (b) the Commission's
jurisdiction, where applicable, supersedes State as well as Federal
agencies. 113
Thus, while the House version of this section may have allowed
limited joint jurisdiction by the SEC and the CFTC over some as-
pects of commodity futures trading,114 the Senate amended the
House provision "in an attempt to avoid unnecessary overlapping
and duplicative regulation." 1 5 The legislative history of the 1978
amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act " ' further supports
the exclusive nature of the CFTC's jurisdiction, stating that the
CFTC was designed "to avoid duplication and confusion in the
regulation of futures trading.1
11 7
The exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC has been upheld re-
peatedly against attempts at regulation by other federal adminis-
trative and legislative authorities.11 8 As one court has stated,
there is little reason to attempt to construe Howey so as to in-
clude discretionary commodities accounts within the bailiwick of
the securities acts and the SEC. Indeed, because of the exclusive
jurisdiction which Congress granted the CFTC over "accounts,
agreements, and transactions involving contracts of sale of a com-
modity for future delivery," it would fly in the face of express
congressional intent to do so.""
113. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5894, 5897.
114. See SEC v. American Commodity Exch., Inc., 546 F.2d 1361, 1368 (10th Cir.
1976).
115. STAFF OF SENATE CoMM. ON AGRICULTURE AND FoREsTRY, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Tim
COMMODITY FUTuRZS TRADING COsUSSION ACT OF 1974, at 6 (Comm. Print 1974), quoted in
SEC v. American Commodity Exch., Inc., 546 F.2d 1361, 1368 (10th Cir. 1976).
116. Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865.
117. S. RXP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2087, 2109.
118. See R.J. Hereley & Son Co. v. Stotler & Co., 466 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. IMI. 1979);
Jones v. B.C. Christopher & Co., 466 F. Supp. 213 (D. Kan. 1979); Hofmayer v. Dean Witter
& Co., 459 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Bartels v. International Commodities Corp., 435 F.
Supp. 865 (D. Conn. 1977).
119. E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Schank, 456 F. Supp. 507, 513 (D. Utah 1976). See gener-
ally 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LowRERELs, SEcuRrnms FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD § 4.6, at
470 (1979); Bromberg, Commodities Law and Securities Law-Overlaps and Preemptions,
1 J. CORP. L. 217, 296-316 (1976); Johnson, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission
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Nevertheless, the SEC staff has refused to take a no-action posi-
tion with respect to discretionary commodity accounts because of
the unsettled state of the law.120 The CFTC, on the other hand,
has asserted that it has exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of
discretionary commodity accounts.1 21 The courts similarly have di-
vided on whether the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction precludes
claims involving discretionary commodity accounts from being
brought under the securities acts.122
Conclusion
Prior to the enactment of the 1974 amendments to the Com-
modity Exchange Act, two separate judicial interpretations had
evolved concerning the element of "common enterprise" in the
Howey definition of investment contract and the relation of the
federal securities acts to discretionary commodity accounts. Even
after the 1974 amendments were enacted, courts in several circuits
have continued to hold that discretionary commodity accounts
may constitute investment contracts under Howey and thus be
subject to the federal securities acts. 23 However, International
Act: Preemption as Public Policy, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1976); Russo & Lyon, The Exclusive
Jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 6 HoFsTRA L. REv. 57 (1977).
120. Response of the Division of Investment Management Regulation to Request for
No-Action Letter, A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 80,153.
One commentator has stated that "the SEC has been about as oblivious of the prohibi-
tions that the Congress put on it in the commodities area as of the prohibitions that the
Supreme Court put on it in the area of fairness of corporate transactions and internal corpo-
rate governance." Bromberg, Securities Law-Relationship to Commodities Law, 35 Bus.
LAW. 787, 791 (1980) (citing Santa Fe v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)).
121. CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 77-2, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. Furr. L.
REP. (CCH) 20,257.
122. Compare Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co., 459 F. Supp. 733, 736-37 (N.D. Cal.
1978) (accepting the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction over discretionary commodity accounts);
Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Prometco, 470 F. Supp. 610, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(same); International Trading Ltd. v. Bell, 262 Ark. 244, 556 S.W.2d 420 (1977) (same); and
Birenbaum v. Bache & Co., 555 S.W.2d 513, 516 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (same), with Rasmus-
sen v. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc., 608 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1979)
(assumed discretionary commodity accounts are subject to securities law); and Moody v.
Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1978) (same). See Hewit, The Line Between Commodi-
ties and Securities (pt. 1), 1 AGIUc. L.J. 291, 319-24 (1979).
123. See Rasmussen v. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss KohlImeyer, Inc., 608 F.2d
175 (5th Cir. 1979) (assumed discretionary commodity accounts are investment contracts in
dealing with whether there was a public offering); Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523 (5th
Cir. 1978); Scheer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1975-1977 Transfer
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Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel compels a narrowing of the
concept of a security where investor protection is adequately se-
cured under the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC. SEC regula-
tion of discretionary commodity accounts no longer champions the
interests of the investor, but merely serves as an unjustified dupli-
cation of efforts under the federal scheme of regulation.
Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,039 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Cf. Curran v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
20,276 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (no investment contract in absence of a common enterprise).
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